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WHY THE SUPREME COURT  
WAS WRONG ABOUT THE SOLOMON 
AMENDMENT 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* 
rom the first week of law school, I try to teach my students that a 
decision from the Supreme Court is not necessarily right and that 
they, and everyone, should feel free to disagree with the Court.  They 
should do so even when the Court is unanimous.  I was reminded of 
this lesson when the Court, by an 8-0 margin, upheld the 
constitutionality of a federal law that requires law schools to allow 
military recruiters on campus.  In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic 
and Institutional Rights (FAIR),1 the Supreme Court upheld the 
Solomon Amendment,2 which provides that if any part of an 
institution of higher learning denies military recruiters access equal 
to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution will lose 
federal funds.3 
The Court’s ruling means that law schools now must give 
preferred status to the military.4  The schools may bar any other 
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disclosed that I was a named plaintiff in the lawsuit that is the focus of this Article, Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). 
 1. 126 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 2. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (stating that the Solomon Amendment requires schools to 
treat the military like other employers). 
F 
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employer that discriminates on the basis of race, gender, religion or 
sexual orientation, but may not exclude the United States military.  
This principle undermines the freedom of speech and freedom of 
association of law schools across the country that do not wish to 
facilitate further discrimination against some of their students. 
Law schools long have had policies excluding from career service 
facilities employers who discriminate on the basis of race, gender, 
religion, or sexual orientation.  Because a federal statute excludes 
gays and lesbians from military service,5 most law schools refused to 
allow the military to use career service offices.  However, a federal 
statute, referred to as the “Solomon Amendment,” was enacted 1995.6  
It provides that educational institutions will lose virtually all federal 
funds if any part of the university denies military recruiters access 
equal to that provided other recruiters.7 
Thus, the issue in Rumsfeld v. FAIR was whether the Solomon 
Amendment violates the First Amendment rights of law schools and 
their faculty and students.8  In a unanimous decision, the Supreme 
Court rejected the constitutional challenge and upheld the law.9 
My thesis in this Article is that the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld v. 
FAIR abandoned basic First Amendment principles.  The decision 
cannot be reconciled with other cases concerning freedom of speech 
and association.  Indeed, if followed, Rumsfeld v. FAIR sets a 
disturbing and dangerous precedent. 
 
 5. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).  The Supreme Court correctly described this statute as providing 
that “a person generally may not serve in the Armed Forces if he has engaged in homosexual acts, 
stated that he is a homosexual, or married a person of the same sex.” FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303. 
 6. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558, 108 
Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994) codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000). 
 7. Id. 
 8. 126 S. Ct. at 1302. 
 9. Id. at 1306. 
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Part I of the Article briefly describes the Solomon Amendment 
and the history of the litigation over it.  Part II describes the Supreme 
Court’s decision and explains how it is inconsistent with long-
standing First Amendment principles.  Finally, Part III suggests that 
the decision must be understood as part of the Supreme Court’s 
historic—and misguided—deference to the military, especially in 
wartime.  I also discuss what happens now that this battle in the fight 
for equality has been lost. 
At the outset, I should admit that I am hardly disinterested when 
it comes to this issue.  I am a member of the board of directors of the 
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights and a named plaintiff 
in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.  I am enormously proud to have been in this 
role.  As a law school faculty member, I believe that law schools 
should refuse to allow any employer that discriminates based on race, 
gender, religion, or sexual orientation from using its career service 
facilities.  All of my students should have equal access to all who 
interview on campus, and any employer who discriminates based on 
invidious characteristics should not be able to have the advantages of 
using law school facilities.  A law firm that refuses to hire African-
American or Jewish or women students should be unwelcome, as 
should any employer that refuses to hire gays or lesbians.  In part, 
this is about ensuring fairness to all of our students.  But also, 
because law schools are in the business of training future lawyers, we 
should be teaching a lesson of equality and non-discrimination.  The 
example law schools set can be a powerful message that 
discrimination is wrong and unacceptable. 
That it is the federal government, through a federal statute, 
excluding gays and lesbians from the military, makes it all the more 
important that law schools refuse to be a party to the discrimination.  
The federal law is based on the premise that there is something 
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wrong with gays and lesbians and that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is acceptable.10  Law schools must, in every way 
possible, say that this is unconscionable and that they will not be a 
part of facilitating the federal government’s continued unacceptable 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
I 
THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT AND THE CHALLENGE TO IT 
Beginning in the 1970s, law schools began to adopt policies to 
exclude from school facilities employers who discriminate on the 
basis of race, gender, or religion.  In 1990, the American Association 
of Law Schools, the governing and accrediting body for law schools, 
voted unanimously to include sexual orientation among the types of 
prohibited discrimination.11 
As a result of such policies, many law schools barred the military 
from using their placement facilities because a federal statute 
excludes gays and lesbians from service in the military.12  Schools 
varied in the extent of their exclusion, but most law schools restricted 
the ability of military recruiters to use law school career services 
offices because of the military’s express policy of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.13  The military could interview students 
 
 10. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (outlining reasons for the military’s policy against 
homosexuality). 
 11. See American Academy of Law Schools, Executive Committee Regulations 6-3.2(a) 
(2004), available at http://www.aals.org/ecr (stating that “a member school . . . shall require 
employers . . . to provide an assurance of the employer’s willingness to observe the principals of 
equal opportunity stated in Bylaw 6-3(b)”). 
 12. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). 
 13. See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.Supp.2d 
269, 282 (D. N.J. 2003) (“Law schools are loathe to endorse or assist in recruiting efforts of the 
United States military because of its policy against homosexual activity.”). 
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off-campus, or at campus ROTC offices, but not within law school 
facilities. 
In response to the law schools’ exclusion of the military, in 1994 
New York Congressman Gerald Solomon proposed an amendment 
to the annual defense appropriations bill that would withhold 
Department of Defense funding from any educational institution 
that excluded the military from using school facilities for recruiting 
purposes.14  This proposal was adopted by both the House and Senate 
and signed into law.15 
In 2001, following the events of September 11, under the more 
conservative Bush administration, the Department of Defense 
informed law schools of their requirement to allow military 
recruiters access equal to all other employers or their universities 
would face the loss of all federal funds.16  In the summer of 2004, 
Congress codified this policy in a statute which provides that law 
schools and their universities face loss of federal funds, unless 
military recruiters are given access “in a manner that is at least equal 
in quality and scope to the [degree of] access to campuses and to 
students that is provided to any other employer.”17 
 
 14. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, H.R. 2401, 103rd Cong. § 571 
(1993) (enacted). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See FAIR, 291 F.Supp.2d at 282 (citing record evidence). 
 17. Ronald Reagan Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 198-375, § 
552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (Supp. 2005).  As the Supreme 
Court explained: 
 The federal funds covered by the Solomon Amendment are specified at 10 U.S.C. § 
983(d)(1) (Supp. 2005) and include funding from the Departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
Education, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration of the Department of Energy. Funds provided for student financial 
assistance are not covered. § 983(d)(2).  The loss of funding applies not only to the 
particular school denying access but university wide. § 983(b).   
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A lawsuit challenging the Solomon Amendment was brought by 
an association of law schools and law faculty, the Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights.  Plaintiffs also included two law 
professors, Sylvia Law, of New York University, and myself, then of 
the University of Southern California.  Three law students were also 
named as plaintiffs in the lawsuit.18 
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
denied the petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and denied 
the government’s motion to dismiss.19  In November 2004, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the 
decision to deny the petitioner’s preliminary injunction motion.20  
The Third Circuit premised its decision on the principle that the 
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that 
infringes his constitutional protected interests—especially, his 
interest in freedom of speech.”21  This doctrine, often called “the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” is firmly established.22  Surely, 
the government could not condition welfare benefits on a 
requirement that recipients refrain from criticizing the government.  
 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1304 n.3 
(2006). 
 18. The Supreme Court found that FAIR had standing and thus concluded that it did not 
need to consider the standing of the other plaintiffs.  Id. at 1303 n.2. 
 19. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 269. 
 20. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3rd 
Cir. 2004). 
 21. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 22. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (holding that the 
specific interests sought to be advanced by a ban on editorializing were either not sufficiently 
substantial or not served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the abridgment of journalistic 
freedoms which the First Amendment protects); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) 
(holding that when the constitutional right to speak is sought to be deterred by a State's general 
taxing program, the State must come forward with sufficient proof to justify its inhibition, or a 
compelling interest at stake as to justify a procedure which results in suppressing protected 
speech). 
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Nor, the Third Circuit concluded, should the government be able to 
condition federal funds on a requirement that law schools forego 
their First Amendment rights.23 
The Third Circuit found that the Solomon Amendment violates 
the First Amendment rights of law schools in two major ways.24  
First, law schools are being compelled to express a message with 
which they strongly disagree.  The Supreme Court long has 
recognized that in addition to preventing suppression of speech, “the 
First Amendment may prevent the government from . . . compelling 
individuals to express certain views.”25  The Solomon Amendment 
does exactly that.  It forces law schools to express a message about the 
presence of the military and its recruiters.  Law schools must 
announce the military’s recruitment via e-mails, flyers, and posters.  
Additionally, law schools must include the military in recruitment 
forums and programs. 
The Third Circuit found a second, separate constitutional 
violation: the Solomon Amendment violates law schools’ freedom of 
association.26  The Supreme Court long has held that groups that 
have an expressive message may exclude in furtherance of it.27  Law 
schools have an expressive message that is against discrimination, 
and in furtherance of that message, they have the right to refuse to 
associate with those who discriminate based on sexual orientation 
and other invidious characteristics. 
 
 23. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 246. 
 24. Id. at 230. 
 25. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (citing, inter alia, W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 639–43 (1943)). 
 26. FAIR, 390 F.3d at 235. 
 27. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647–48 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)) (noting that protection of the right to expressive 
association “is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding 
dissident expression from suppression by the majority”). 
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II 
WHY THE SUPREME COURT WAS WRONG 
In a unanimous opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the Solomon 
Amendment.28  The Court concluded that neither of the First 
Amendment grounds found by the Third Circuit had any merit.29 
Interestingly, the Court said that there was no need for it to 
consider whether there was an unconstitutional condition because 
Congress would have the authority to directly compel universities to 
allow the military to recruit on campuses.30  Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote:  
The Constitution grants Congress the power to “provide for 
the common Defence,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” and 
“[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.”  Congress’ power in 
this area “is broad and sweeping,” and there is no dispute in 
this case that it includes the authority to require campus 
access for military recruiters.  That is, of course, unless 
Congress exceeds constitutional limitations on its power in 
enacting such legislation.31 
The Court said, though, that “[u]nder this principle, known as 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Solomon Amendment 
would be unconstitutional if Congress could not directly require 
universities to provide military recruiters equal access to their 
students.”32  In other words, the Court reaffirmed the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and said that the issue was 
whether the requirement of military access violated the First 
 
 28. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1301, 
1313 (2006). 
 29. Id. at 1313. 
 30. Id. at 1306. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1307. 
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Amendment.  Subsequently, the Court proceeded to reject each of 
the First Amendment claims that had been accepted by the Third 
Circuit.33 
A. Compelled Speech 
First, the Court rejected that there was any compelled speech.34  
Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[t]he Solomon Amendment 
does not require any . . . expression by law schools . . . .  There is 
nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or 
motto that the school must endorse.”35  The Court explained that 
students surely could understand that schools were not endorsing the 
military or its exclusion of gays and lesbians.36  Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote: “We have held that high school students can appreciate the 
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school 
permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access 
policy.  Surely students have not lost that ability by the time they get 
to law school.”37 
The Court stressed that law schools were still free to express their 
own views, even though they had to allow the military on campus to 
use career service facilities.  Chief Justice Roberts explained: “The 
Solomon Amendment neither limits what law schools may say nor 
requires them to say anything.  Law schools remain free under the 
statute to express whatever views they may have on the military’s 
 
 33. Id. at 1313. 
 34. Id. at 1308. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1307. 
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congressionally mandated employment policy, all the while retaining 
eligibility for federal funds.”38 
There are two flaws in the Court’s reasoning here, one factual and 
one legal.  The factual error is in concluding that law schools are not 
required by the Solomon Amendment to engage in expression.  Law 
schools are required to disseminate literature in student mailboxes; 
post job announcements on bulletin boards; maintain leaflets in 
binders for reference by students; publish précis in printed catalogs; 
e-mail students about interview possibilities; arrange appointments 
for students; supply private meeting rooms for discussion with 
candidates; reserve spots at private forums; and potentially post “JAG 
Corps” banners.39  All of this is speech activity that is compelled by 
the Solomon Amendment.40 
The Court’s legal error is even more serious.  Never before has 
the Supreme Court said that compelled speech is permissible so long 
as the speaker is allowed to disavow the forced message and engage 
in other speech.  The classic case concerning compelled speech was 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, which declared 
unconstitutional a state law that required that children salute the 
flag.41  Justice Robert Jackson, writing for the Court, eloquently said: 
The compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a 
belief and an attitude of mind. . . .  If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
 
 38. Id. at 1308. 
 39. This non-inclusive list is based on the author’s experience with employer recruiting at 
law schools. 
 40. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1). 
 41. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.42 
The Court followed this principle in other cases, such as in 
Wooley v. Maynard, where it ruled that an individual could not be 
punished for blocking out the portion of his automobile license plate 
that contained the New Hampshire state motto, “Live Free or Die.”43  
The Court said that:  
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all.  The right to speak and 
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary 
components of the broader concept of “individual freedom 
of mind.”44 
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of California, the Court declared unconstitutional a 
utility commission regulation that required that a private utility 
company include in its billing envelopes materials prepared by a 
public interest group.45  The utility commission sought to provide a 
more balanced presentation of views on energy issues;46 the public 
interest group’s statements were to be a counterpoint to the 
statements by the utility companies.47  But the Court found that such 
compelled access violated the First Amendment.  Justice Powell, 
writing for the Court, said that “[c]ompelled access like that ordered 
in this case both penalizes the expression of particular points of view 
 
 42. Id. at 633, 642. 
 43. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 44. Id. at 714 (citations omitted). 
 45. 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). 
 46. Id. at 5–7. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
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and forces speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda 
they do not set.”48 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston also involved an issue of forced expression.49  Every St. 
Patrick’s Day, the Veterans Council, a private group, organizes a 
parade in Boston.50  The Veterans Council refused to allow the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston to participate 
in its parade.51  The Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Group sued in Massachusetts state court based on the state’s public 
accommodations law that prohibited discrimination by business 
establishments on the basis on sexual orientation.52  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided with the Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group.53 
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  The 
Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, said that organizing a parade 
is inherently expressive activity and that it violated the First 
Amendment to force the organizers to include messages that they 
find inimical.54  Justice Souter explained that compelling the Veterans 
Council to include the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
Group “violates the fundamental rule . . . under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content 
of his own message.”55 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). 
 50. Id. at 560–61. 
 51. Id. at 561. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 563–64. 
 54. Id. at 573. 
 55. Id. at 572. 
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The Court expressly invoked the principle discussed above that 
there is a First Amendment right not to speak.  Justice Souter wrote 
that “the Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like 
from the communication it chose to make, and that is enough to 
invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by 
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.”56 
It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR with these decisions.  In none of them did the 
Court say, as it did in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, that the ability of the speaker 
to engage in other speech allowed the government to compel 
expression.  Nor did the Court say, as it did in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, that 
the ability of the audience to recognize that it was compelled speech 
made it permissible. 
In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court did 
not say that compelled flag salutes were permissible simply because 
the students were able to present alternative viewpoints.57  Nor in 
Wooley v. Maynard was the required phrase on the license plate 
allowed just because the driver could put a bumper sticker on his car 
protesting the compelled message or just because those seeing the 
license plate would know that the slogan was there because of the 
state’s compelled speech.58  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of California, the Court held that a state agency 
cannot require a utility company to include a third-party newsletter 
in its billing envelope, even though the utility company could express 
its own message of disagreement with the compelled speech.59  In 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 
 
 56. Id. at 575. 
 57. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 58. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 59. 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). 
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the compelled speech was not excused because the parade organizers 
could have spoken out against the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual 
group.60 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, if followed, would eliminate the principle that 
compelled speech violates the First Amendment.  Instead, it would 
substitute the view that the government can compel speech so long as 
the speaker than can disagree with the forced message.  This is not 
only a radical departure from precedent, but also highly undesirable.  
As the Supreme Court has held for decades, the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of speech also includes a right to not speak.61  
Allowing the government to compel speech, under the assumption 
that the speaker can then disagree with its message, dissolves one’s 
right to not speak.  That right is precious under an Amendment that 
guarantees freedom of conscience. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion also attempted to 
distinguish the cases by stating: 
The compelled speech violation in each of our prior cases, 
however, resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s 
own message was affected by the speech it was forced to 
accommodate. . . .  In this case, accommodating the military’s 
message does not affect the law schools’ speech, because the 
schools are not speaking when they host interviews and 
recruiting receptions.62 
But this is just wrong.  Under the Solomon Amendment, law 
schools are required to disseminate literature in student mailboxes 
 
 60. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 61. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 9 (noting that “the essential thrust of the First 
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas. . . . 
There is necessarily . . . a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same 
ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect” (citations omitted)). 
 62. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1309 
(2006). 
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that they would not have to put there otherwise.  They must post job 
announcements on bulletin boards that otherwise would not be 
there.  They must e-mail students about interview possibilities and 
arrange appointments for students.  They must allow the military to 
participate in employment forums held by them, and they must allow 
the military to display its banners. 
The irony the Court never acknowledges is that in all of the prior 
cases the Supreme Court rejected the government’s power to require 
equal access.  In Hurley, for example, the Court said that the 
government could not require that the parade organizers allow the 
gay and lesbian group to march in the same way as other groups.63  
But in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Court said that the government can 
force law schools to give the military preferred access.64  Any other 
employer who discriminates based on sexual orientation can be 
excluded, but not the military. 
B. Freedom of Association 
Second, the Court rejected the claim that the Solomon 
Amendment interfered with law schools’ freedom of association.65  
The Court said that its earlier decisions concerning freedom of 
association involved the ability of a group to exclude certain people 
from membership, but the Solomon Amendment had nothing to do 
with membership.66  Chief Justice Roberts wrote: “Unlike the public 
accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not 
force a law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’”67  The 
 
 63. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559. 
 64. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1312. 
 67. Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)). 
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Court again emphasized that there is not a violation of the First 
Amendment because “[s]tudents and faculty are free to associate to 
voice their disapproval of the military’s message.”68 
But on careful consideration, the Court’s distinctions to Dale 
should not make a difference.  As the Court recognized, Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale is the key case here.69  In Dale, in a 5 to 4 decision, 
the Court held that freedom of association protects the Boy Scouts’ 
right to exclude gays in violation of a state’s antidiscrimination 
statute.70  Dale was a lifelong Scout who had reached the rank of 
Eagle Scout and had become an assistant scoutmaster.71  While in 
college he became involved in gay rights activities.  Dale was quoted 
in a newspaper article after attending a seminar on the psychological 
needs of gay and lesbian teenagers and was identified in the article as 
the co-president of the Gay/Lesbian Alliance at Rutgers University.72  
A scout official saw this article and then sent Dale a letter, excluding 
him from further participation in the Scouts.73 
Dale sued under the New Jersey law that prohibits discrimination 
by places of public accommodation.74  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court found that the Boy Scouts are a “public accommodation” 
within the meaning of the law and rejected the Boy Scouts’ claim that 
freedom of association protected their right to discriminate based on 
sexual orientation.75 
 
 68. Id. at 1313. 
 69. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 70. Id. at 659. 
 71. Id. at 641. 
 72. Id. at 645. 
 73. Id. at 643. 
 74. N.J. Stat Ann. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (West Supp. 2000). 
 75. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999). 
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The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Boy Scouts’ 
desire to exclude gays fits within either of the exceptions recognized 
in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.76  Since the Boy Scouts are a large 
national organization, they could not realistically claim to be an 
“intimate association.”  Instead, they argued that they had an 
expressive message that was anti-gay and that forcing them to 
include homosexuals undermined this communicative goal.77 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion acknowledged that 
“[o]bviously, the Scout Oath and Law do not expressly mention 
sexuality or sexual orientation.”78  But Chief Justice Rehnquist was 
willing to find such a goal based on the Boy Scouts’ interpretation of 
its own words, such as its command that scouts be “morally straight,” 
and from the position it had taken during litigation.79 
In other words, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
essentially held that a group could define its own expressive message 
during litigation.80  Chief Justice Rehnquist said that the failure to 
clearly state such a communicative goal in advance is not 
determinative: “The fact that the organization does not trumpet its 
views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, 
does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment 
protection.”81 
 
 76. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656–59.  See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 
U.S. 609, 622–23 (1984) (noting that the government may seek to impose limitations on a group’s 
freedom of association by imposing penalties or withholding benefits because of their 
membership in a disfavored group; it may attempt to require disclosure of the fact of membership 
in a group seeking anonymity; or, it may try to interfere with the internal organization or affairs 
of the group) (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (No. 99-699). 
 78. 530 U.S. at 650. 
 79. Id. at 650–51. 
 80. Id. at 656. 
 81. Id. 
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The analogy to Rumsfeld v. FAIR is powerful.  Forced association 
that interferes with an organization’s expressive message was found 
to violate the First Amendment.82  The fact that the Boy Scouts could 
find other ways to express their anti-gay message was not enough to 
allow forced association.83  Nor should it matter whether the forced 
association was in the form of membership or other means.  It is the 
compelled association, and not its specific form, that is objectionable 
under the First Amendment. 
If followed, Rumsfeld v. FAIR would dramatically change the law.  
It would limit protection of freedom of association to the 
membership context.  Moreover, it would mean that the government 
could compel association, so long as the individual or institution 
could express its disagreement with the mandate. 
Simply put, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court held that 
the government could not compel association in a manner that is 
inconsistent with a group’s expressive message.84  But the Solomon 
Amendment does just this.  No one disputes the fact that law schools 
have an expressive message of disapproving discrimination. 
III 
WHY AND WHAT NOW? 
My primary focus thus far has been in demonstrating that 
Rumsfeld v. FAIR was a significant departure from well-established 
First Amendment principles.  I believe that understanding the 
decision requires seeing it as part of the Court’s historical deference 
 
 82. Id. at 659. 
 83. Id. at 656–59. 
 84. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312 
(2006). 
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to the military, especially in time of war.  In fact, at the outset of the 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts said just this:  
But the fact that legislation that raises armies is subject to 
First Amendment constraints does not mean that we ignore 
the purpose of this legislation when determining its 
constitutionality; as we recognized in Rostker [v. 
Goldberg],85 “judicial deference . . . is at its apogee” when 
Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support 
armies.86 
But what the Court ignores is that such deference has almost 
always in hindsight been regarded as a mistake.  For example, few 
Supreme Court decisions are regarded as more in error than 
Korematsu v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of the 
government’s evacuation of Japanese-Americans from the west coast 
during World War II.87  Moreover, as the Third Circuit pointed out, 
there is no need for such deference to the military with regard to the 
Solomon Amendment.88  Never during the litigation did the 
government offer a shred of evidence that law schools’ exclusion of 
military recruiters had the slightest adverse effect on military 
recruitment. 
What now?  Law schools, and their faculty and students, must 
protest the military’s presence on campus and the military’s policy of 
excluding gays and lesbians.  The Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR 
emphasized that law schools are free to express their own messages of 
protest and disagreement with the military.89  Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote: “Law schools remain free under the statute to express 
 
 85. 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981). 
 86. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting 453 U.S. at 70). 
 87. 323 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1944). 
 88. See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1309 (“[T]he Third Circuit concluded that the Solomon 
Amendment unconstitutionally compels law schools to accommodate the military's message.”). 
 89. Id. at 1307. 
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whatever views they may have on the military’s congressionally 
mandated employment policy, all the while retaining eligibility for 
federal funds.”90  The Court added: 
[The] Solicitor General acknowledg[ed] that law schools “could 
put signs on the bulletin board next to the door, they could 
engage in speech, they could help organize student protests” . . . . 
[The Solomon Amendment] affects what law schools must do—
afford equal access to military recruiters not what they may or 
may not say.91 
Thus, law schools, and their faculty and students, are allowed to 
protest the military’s presence on campus in any way they choose, so 
long as they do not exclude the military.  They need to do so and to 
express their strong disagreement with the exclusion of gays and 
lesbians from the military. 
That, of course, is what all of this is about: a federal statute, based 
on prejudice and stereotypes, that discriminates on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  Efforts must concentrate on eliminating that law 
and the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the military. 
I have heard many say that FAIR and the other plaintiffs in the 
suit were anti-military.  In fact, the lawsuit is based on just the 
opposite: the desire to allow more people to serve in the armed 
forces.  The lawsuit was brought by those who believe that their 
schools should not facilitate discrimination.  Rather, they should 
adhere to long-standing policies that employers who discriminate are 
not welcome in law schools.  It is sad that the Court was so 
insensitive to this interest and abandoned well-established First 
Amendment principles out of its desire to defer to the military. 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 25). 
